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“Only Dust Remains[?]”1 
THE 9/11 MEMORIAL LITIGATION AND THE REACH 
OF QUASI-PROPERTY RIGHTS 
INTRODUCTION 
On September 12, 2011, at a quiet Pennsylvania field 
softened from days of rainfall, several families gathered for a 
private funeral service to bury three coffins in the ground.2 The 
approximately-six-foot steel boxes held not bodies, but the 
fragmented and unidentified remains of the passengers from 
United Airlines Flight 93 (United 93), one of the airplanes 
hijacked by terrorists on 9/11.3 United 93 crashed into this 
same field in Shanksville ten years earlier, killing everyone on 
board.4 Because the plane plunged into the earth at more than 
570 miles per hour, only eight percent of the victims’ remains 
were ultimately recovered.5 Nevertheless, partial remains for 
each of the forty victims were identified.6 This fact brought 
closure to the families, who had reached a consensus regarding 
the final resting place of their loved ones’ commingled remains.7 
Over the previous ten years, family members had attended 
countless memorials for the victims of United 93, but they 
could now declare, “This will be our last funeral . . . .”8 
Nearly 300 miles away in New York City, the families of 
victims of the World Trade Center (WTC) attack lacked similar 
closure and accord.9 Unlike at Shanksville, the remains of more 
than 1100 victims had yet to be identified.10 For the last ten 
  
 1 WTC Families for a Proper Burial, Inc. v. City of New York, 567 F. Supp. 
2d 529, 532 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff’d, 359 F. App’x 177 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 2 See Katharine Q. Seelye, At a 9/11 Site, a “Last Funeral,” N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 10, 2011, at A9. 
 3 Id. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Id. 
 6 Id. 
 7 Id. 
 8 Id. 
 9 See Anemona Hartocollis, An Unsettled Legacy for 9/11 Remains, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 1, 2011, at MB1. 
 10 See Jo Craven McGinty, As 9/11 Remains Are Identified, Grief Is Renewed, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2011, at A1; see also Seelye, supra note 2, at A9. At the Pentagon, 
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years, the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner of New York 
City (OCME) has housed the unidentified remains in a 
temporary structure adjacent to its Manhattan office building.11 
At that site, forensic scientists continue to test the remains for 
DNA identification. In 2013, however, New York City (City) 
officials plan to transfer the 9000-plus unidentified fragments 
to a repository located underneath the National September 11 
Memorial and Museum (Memorial).12 There, OCME will have 
sole access to the facility to continue DNA testing, except for 
family members wishing to visit the site.13 Memorial 
administrators claim that the remains repository was 
established “[i]n response to overwhelming feedback received 
from families,”14 and that it “will provide a dignified and 
reverential setting for the remains to repose—temporarily or in 
perpetuity—as identifications continue to be made.”15 
In the months preceding the tenth anniversary of the 
9/11 attacks, the media reported a growing dispute between 
some of the victims’ families and City officials concerning the 
relocation of the remains to the Memorial repository.16 These 
families denounced the planned repository, arguing that they 
were neither properly notified nor given the opportunity to 
participate in the decision.17 Additionally, they contended that 
placing the remains within a museum would be disrespectful to 
the memory of the victims.18 In response, Memorial officials 
issued a statement summarizing their efforts to reach out to 
the WTC families regarding the repository.19 The release noted 
  
five of the 184 victims’ remains also were never identified. See id. All unidentified 
remains were buried at Arlington National Cemetery. See id. 
 11 See Remains Repository at the World Trade Center Site, 9/11 MEMORIAL, 
http://www.911memorial.org/remains-repository-world-trade-center-site (last visited 
Jan. 16, 2012) [hereinafter Remains Repository]. 
 12 See Hartocollis, supra note 9, at MB1 (outlining how the objecting families, 
“appalled by the idea of remains that could belong to their loved ones being turned into 
a lure for tourists, want[ed] them kept in a separate above-ground memorial that 
would be treated like hallowed ground”). 
 13 See Remains Repository, supra note 11. The repository “will not be accessible 
or visible to the public” and any family member wishing to visit the facility will be 
permitted access without having to pay an admission fee to enter the Memorial. Id. 
 14 Id. 
 15 Id. (emphasis added). 
 16 Hartocollis, supra note 9, at MB1. 
 17 See id. 
 18 See id. 
 19 See 9/11 MEMORIAL, SUMMARY OF OUTREACH REGARDING PLANS TO 
RELOCATE THE CITY OF NEW YORK’S OFFICE OF CHIEF MEDICAL EXAMINER’S (OCME’S) 
REPOSITORY FOR THE UNIDENTIFIED AND UNCLAIMED REMAINS OF 9/11 VICTIMS, available 
at http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/97985/memorial-museum-response.pdf (last 
visited Oct. 20, 2012) [hereinafter SUMMARY OF OUTREACH]. 
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that a committee purportedly representing the victims’ families, 
and assembled under the aegis of the Lower Manhattan 
Development Corporation (LMDC),20 had approved the repository 
proposal, and it detailed how, from 2002 to 2006, LMDC sought 
input from the families via direct mailings and public forums.21 
The dissenting families subsequently requested the 
names and addresses of all the victims’ next of kin from the 
City in order to poll them about the proposed repository.22 After 
the City refused, they filed for injunctive relief in New York 
court.23 In Regenhard v. City of New York, the New York County 
Supreme Court sided with the City, concluding that releasing 
the names and addresses “would constitute an unwarranted 
invasion of personal privacy.”24 The court explained that the 
City had “no obligation to seek the families’ input as to where 
the unidentified human remains will be located—they are only 
required to disclose the information as to where the remains 
will be located.”25 The dissenting families appealed the decision, 
which is currently pending.26 
Regenhard has significance beyond its seemingly 
exiguous purposes. In particular, this preliminary lawsuit 
raises a more fundamental and perhaps more difficult question: 
who is legally empowered to determine the final disposition of 
these unidentified human remains? Like most jurisdictions in 
the United States,27 New York has recognized the surviving next 
  
 20 In November 2002, LMDC announced that it was creating the Memorial 
Mission Statement Drafting Committee in order to “draft a mission statement that will 
be used to guide the development” of the WTC Memorial. Press Release, LMDC, 
Committees Created to Draft WTC Memorial Mission Statement and Program (Nov. 
12, 2002), available at http://www.renewnyc.com/displaynews.aspx?newsid=e3f87188-
1ed5-4193-943b-5fd10befab20. The starting point for the statement would be a 
preliminary draft authored by the LMDC Families Advisory Council. Id. LMDC said 
that the mission statement would incorporate “extensive public input . . . through 
Advisory Councils, public forums in every borough and New Jersey, a questionnaire 
sent to relatives of every World Trade Center victim, and thousands of emails sent to 
LMDC.” Id.; cf. Families Advisory Council Meeting Minutes, LMDC (Aug. 13, 2002), 
available at http://www.renewnyc.com/AboutUs/AdvisoryMeetings.aspx. 
 21 See SUMMARY OF OUTREACH, supra note 19. 
 22 See Anemona Hartocollis, Poll of 9/11 Families Is Sought over Unidentified 
Remains, N.Y. TIMES (June 2, 2011), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/06/02/poll-
of-911-families-is-sought-over-unidentified-remains/. 
 23 See Order to Show Cause at 1-2, Regenhard v. City of New York, No. 
109548/2011 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 18, 2011). 
 24 Regenhard, No. 109548/2011, slip op. at 6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 25, 2011). 
 25 Id. at 7. 
 26 See Maria Alvarez, 9/11 Families Appeal to Judge on Victims List, NEWSDAY 
(Aug. 20, 2012), http://www.newsday.com/long-island/9-11-families-appeal-to-judge-on-
victims-list-1.3916407. 
 27 See, e.g., Fuller v. Marx, 724 F.2d 717, 719 (8th Cir. 1984) (Arkansas law); 
Enos v. Snyder, 63 P. 170, 171 (Cal. 1900); Culpepper v. Pearl St. Bldg., Inc., 877 P.2d 
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of kin’s right to immediate possession of the deceased’s body for 
preservation and burial as a legally protected interest since as 
early as 1857.28 Often referred to as a “quasi-property right,”29 or 
alternatively as the “right of sepulcher,” this common-law 
creation vests something less than full ownership in the next of 
kin “to choose and control the burial, cremation, or other final 
disposition of a dead human body.”30 Under New York law, the 
next of kin has the right to receive the body once the coroner’s 
office has concluded its statutorily-authorized investigative 
duties.31 However, whether the quasi-property right extends to 
unidentified remains possessed by the medical examiner upon 
completion of its responsibilities remains unsettled.32  
The primary question this note seeks to answer is 
whether the New York quasi-property right attaches to the 
commingled and yet-to-be-identified remains of WTC victims. 
While the answer to this question may appear trivial in light of 
  
877, 880 (Co. 1994); Dunahoo v. Bess, 200 So. 541, 542 (Fla. 1941); Louisville & N. R. 
Co. v. Wilson, 51 S.E. 24, 26-27 (Ga. 1905); Beam v. Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co., 
97 Ill. App. 24, 28 (App. Ct. 1901); Anderson v. Acheson, 110 N.W. 335, 336 (Iowa 
1907); Blanchard v. Brawley, 75 So. 2d 891, 893 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1954); Radomer 
Russ-Pol Unterstitzunf Verein v. Posner, 4 A.2d 743, 747 (Md. 1939); Weld v. Walker, 
130 Mass. 422, 423 (1881); Doxtator v. Chicago & W.M. Ry. Co., 79 N.W. 922, 922 
(Mich. 1899); Larson v. Chase, 50 N.W. 238, 238 (Minn. 1891); Spiegel v. Evergreen 
Cemetery, 186 A. 585, 586 (N.J. 1936); Barela v. Hubbell Co., 355 P.2d 133, 136 (N.M. 
1960); Gurganious v. Simpson, 197 S.E. 163, 164 (N.C. 1938); Wynkoop v. Wynkoop, 42 
Pa. 293, 301 (1862); Pierce v. Proprietors of Swan Point Cemetery, 10 R.I. 227, 242-43 
(1872); Griffith v. Charlotte, Columbia & Augusta R.R., 23 S.C. 25, 32 (1885); Coty v. 
Baughman, 210 N.W. 348, 350 (S.D. 1926); Terrill v. Harbin, 376 S.W.2d 945, 947 (Tex. 
Civ. App. 1964); Smart v. Moyer (In re Estate of Moyer), 577 P.2d 108, 110 (Utah 1978) 
(holding that the right to a decedent’s body “is a property right of a special nature . . . 
[but] should [not] be regarded as an absolute property right . . . .”); Nichols v. Cent. Vt. 
Ry. Co., 109 A. 905, 907-08 (Vt. 1919); Sanford v. Ware, 60 S.E.2d 10, 13-14 (Va. 1950); 
Koerbor v. Patek, 102 N.W. 40, 45-46 (Wis. 1905). 
 28 See Correa v. Maimonides Med. Ctr., 629 N.Y.S.2d 673, 675 (Sup. Ct. 1995) 
(“The law is well settled that the surviving next of kin have a right to the immediate 
possession of a decedent’s body for preservation and burial and that damages will be 
awarded against any person who unlawfully interferes with that right or improperly 
deals with the decedent’s body.”); In re Widening of Beekman St., 4 Brad. Sur. 503, 530, 
532 (N.Y. 1857). 
 29 Pierce, 10 R.I. at 238. 
 30 Kimberly E. Naguit, Note, Letting the Dead Bury the Dead: Missouri’s Right 
of Sepulcher Addresses the Modern Decedent’s Wishes, 75 MO. L. REV. 249, 250 (2010). 
 31 See Shipley v. City of New York, 908 N.Y.S.2d 425, 427-32 (App. Div. 2010). 
 32 See, e.g., WTC Families for a Proper Burial, Inc. v. City of New York, 567 
F. Supp. 2d 529, 537 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (finding that “[n]o case has extended . . . a right to 
an undifferentiated mass of dirt that may or may not contain undetectable traces of 
human remains not identifiable to any particular human being”), aff’d, 359 F. App’x 
177 (2d Cir. 2009); Comite en Memoria del Vuelo 587 Inc. v. Hirsch, No. 100382/2005, 
slip op. at 3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 26, 2005) (noting that no New York State “case, statute, 
rule or regulation . . . deals specifically with a situation where human remains are 
unable to be identified or are identified in increments”).  
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the extraordinary facts of the Memorial case,33 the issue is not 
novel. The families of the American Airlines Flight 58734 crash 
victims litigated this very issue, but New York law failed to 
provide these families with a mechanism to decide how to 
dispose of the remains held by OCME.35 The disposition of 
unidentified remains also arose in the aftermath of Hurricane 
Katrina, and one commentator noted the “urgent need 
for . . . application and contemplation” of the quasi-property 
right in mass-disaster events.36 More recently, newspapers 
chronicled how the Dover Air Force Base mortuary disposed of 
military service-members’ cremated and unidentifiable remains 
by dumping them in landfills.37 DNA testing has “found 
increasing use as a means to identify remains after . . . mass 
disasters,” and “[s]uccessful identifications have been made in 
recent years following aircraft crashes and for misplaced 
crematory corpses.”38 Therefore, an analysis of the Memorial 
litigation carries implications extending far beyond the unique 
facts of the case. 
For the time being, OCME has the right to possess the 
remains indefinitely while it continues DNA testing. As 
  
 33 For purposes of this note, in order to avoid confusion with WTC Families, a 
2008 case in S.D.N.Y., I will refer to the current dispute over the relocation of the WTC 
victims remains as the “Memorial case” or “Memorial litigation.”  
 34 Flight 587 crashed into Belle Harbor, Queens on November 12, 2001 
shortly after takeoff from John F. Kennedy International Airport, killing all 260 
passengers and crew aboard the aircraft as well as five people on the ground. See 
Verified Petition at 2-3, Hirsch, No. 100382/2005; see also Amy Z. Mundorff, 
Anthropologist-Directed Triage: Three Distinct Mass Fatality Events Involving 
Fragmentation of Human Remains, in RECOVERY, ANALYSIS, AND IDENTIFICATION OF 
COMMINGLED HUMAN REMAINS 123, 126 (B. Adams & J. Byrd eds., 2008). 
 35 See Hirsch, No. 100382/2005, slip op. at 3. 
 36 Sarah Tomkins, Priam’s Lament: The Intersection of Law and Morality in the 
Right to Burial and Its Need for Recognition in Post-Katrina New Orleans, 12 UDC/DCSL 
L. REV. 93, 94 (2009); see also Laura Maggi, Katrina Dead Interred at New Memorial, 
TIMES-PICAYUNE (Aug. 29, 2008), http://www.nola.com/news/index.ssf/2008/08/ 
katrina_dead_interred_at_new_m.html. 
 37 See Craig Whitlock & Mary Pat Flaherty, Hundreds of Troops’ Ashes Put in 
Landfill, WASH. POST, Dec. 7, 2011, at A1, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
world/national-security/air-force-dumped-ashes-of-more-troops-in-va-landfill-than-
acknowledged/2011/12/07/gIQAT8ybdO_print.html. 
 38 C.H. Brenner & B.S. Weir, Issues and Strategies in the DNA Identification 
of World Trade Center Victims, 63 THEORETICAL POPULATION BIOLOGY 173, 173 (2003) 
(citations omitted); see also Dorothy Nelkin & Lori Andrews, Do the Dead Have 
Interests? Policy Issues for Research After Life, 24 AM. J.L. & MED. 261, 285 (1998) 
(describing a California case where “[t]he emotional distress of relatives was also at 
issue in . . . a 1991 class action against mortuaries, funeral homes and crematoriums 
that had handled as many as 16,000 bodies”). For additional information on the 1991 
class action case, see Suit Says UCLA Medical School Illegally Disposed of Bodies, L.A. 
TIMES, Nov. 1, 1996, at 4, available at http://articles.latimes.com/1996-11-01/local/me-
60189_1_body-program. 
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discussed below, improvements in forensic DNA analysis have 
enabled OCME to identify WTC victims in ways that were 
impossible ten years ago.39 It is conceivable that OCME will 
eventually be able to identify remains for most, and possibly 
all, of the WTC victims.40 Nevertheless, thousands of fragments 
will likely never be identified. If and when the medical 
examiner terminates DNA testing, some entity, individual, or 
collection of individuals will have to decide what to do with the 
residual remains. As the dispute over the Memorial repository 
indicates, the WTC families care deeply about the final 
disposition of their loved ones’ remains, and some have been 
willing to litigate the issue.  
This note contends that in situations like the Memorial 
case, where the next of kin claim a quasi-property right over 
commingled and unidentified remains, the complex web of New 
York common and statutory law relegates the remains to a 
state of legal limbo. The next of kin are able to claim or waive 
their rights to any remains identified by OCME in the future, 
but they cannot assert their quasi-property rights to immediate 
possession of these remains until they are affirmatively 
identified. At the same time, OCME, which ostensibly 
possesses the right to dispose of unidentified human remains, 
is unlikely to do so while claims are outstanding. Consequently, 
any residual remains will persist as OCME laboratory 
specimens in perpetuity, subject of course to further advances 
in DNA testing. It certainly appears, as one participant in this 
dispute has lamented, that “since unidentified remains 
potentially belong to all the families, they belong to none.”41 
Though no perfect solution exists, legislators need not 
acquiesce to the status quo. New York City law should be 
modified to establish standards and procedures to ensure 
mandatory repatriation and consultation with the next of kin 
when determining how commingled and unidentified remains 
should be put to rest. Part I of this note will briefly summarize 
recent advances in forensic DNA analysis to demonstrate that, 
inevitably, the City will have to grapple with who controls the 
WTC residual remains’ final disposition. Part II will evaluate 
current New York law governing the disposition of human 
remains, concluding that it relegates unidentified remains to a 
  
 39 See infra Part I. 
 40 See infra Part I. 
 41 Chip Colwell-Chanthaphonh & Alice M. Greenwald, “The Disappeared”: 
Power over the Dead in the Aftermath of 9/11, 27 ANTHROPOLOGY TODAY, June 2011, at 6.  
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state of legal limbo. Part III will then survey the origins, 
underpinnings, and scope of the modern quasi-property right, 
concluding that the Memorial case has highlighted the outer 
boundary of the right: DNA identification. Finally, this note 
recommends that New York City modify its laws governing the 
disposition of human remains. Specifically, the City should look 
to repatriation of Native American remains under the Native 
American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act,42 a federal 
statute that endeavors to resolve analogous collective disputes 
over unidentified human remains. 
I. ADVANCES IN FORENSIC DNA ANALYSIS HAVE IMPROVED 
THE PROSPECT OF IDENTIFYING REMAINS FOR MOST OF 
THE WORLD TRADE CENTER VICTIMS 
On September 11, 2001, 2753 people perished at the 
World Trade Center after terrorists flew two commercial jets 
into the towers.43 In the aftermath, “the Mayor of New York 
City directed [OCME] to do everything humanly possible to 
identify every fragment of human remains.”44  
Given the unprecedented nature of the WTC disaster 
with respect to the volume and condition of the remains,45 
forensic DNA analysis constituted the most efficacious means 
to identify the victims.46 The vast majority of the victims were 
fragmented by the towers’ collapse, which amalgamated body 
parts with the steel, concrete, and glass of the destroyed 
  
 42 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3013 (2006). 
 43 OFFICE OF THE CHIEF MED. EXAMINER, WORLD TRADE CENTER OPERATIONAL 
STATISTICS (last updated Oct. 16, 2012) [hereinafter WTC OPERATIONAL STATISTICS] (on 
file with the author). While some sources vary on the total fatalities and other statistics, 
this note uses OCME’s official tabulations unless otherwise noted. 
 44 Glenn R. Schmitt, Introduction to Excerpts from Lessons Learned from 
9/11: DNA Identification in Mass Fatality Incidents, 1 S. NEW ENG. ROUNDTABLE 
SYMP. L.J. 13, 17 (2006). 
 45 Leslie G. Biesecker et al., DNA Identifications After the 9/11 World Trade 
Center Attack, 310 SCIENCE 1122, 1122 (2005). 
 46 Robert Shaler & Thomas J. Bode, DNA Identification of the Missing After 
the WTC Attacks: A Cooperative Public/Private Effort, FORENSIC MAG., Aug.-Sept. 
2011, available at http://www.forensicmag.com/article/dna-identification-missing-after-
wtc-attacks-cooperative-publicprivate-effort; see also Brenner & Weir, supra note 38, at 
177 (noting that “[i]n most cases little but DNA [could] possibly be used to identify 
[WTC victims]”). These predictions proved prescient as 88% of the 999 victims 
identified by a “single modality” were identified by DNA. WTC OPERATIONAL 
STATISTICS, supra note 43. Nearly “one-third of all the decedents (over half of those 
ultimately identified) would not have been identified” but for DNA analysis. James R. 
Gill et al., The 9/11 Attacks: The Medicolegal Investigation of the World Trade Center 
Fatalities, 6 FORENSIC PATHOLOGY REVS. 181, 186 (2011). 
238 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78:1 
buildings.47 Some victims “disappeared without a trace”48 as 
body parts were exposed to 1000°C fires that took over three 
months to squelch, leaving them nearly indistinguishable from 
inorganic material.49 These problems were compounded by 
OCME’s understandable unpreparedness for a disaster of this 
magnitude.50 Initial estimates placed the number of potential 
victims at 20,000.51 Accordingly, Dr. Charles Hirsch, the Chief 
Medical Examiner, made the unprecedented decision “to DNA-
test every piece of human remains no matter how small,” 
ensuring that no potential victims would be overlooked.52  
Expectations that OCME scientists would promptly 
identify all WTC victims by DNA testing proved to be 
misguided.53 The extreme conditions at the WTC site quickly 
deteriorated the quality of DNA profiles, overwhelming 
contemporary scientific capabilities.54 Moreover, the remains 
  
 47 Biesecker et al., supra note 45, at 1122; Zoran M. Budimlija et al., World 
Trade Center Human Identification Project: Experiences with Individual Body 
Identification Cases, 44 CROATIAN MED. J. 259, 259 (2003) (cataloguing “the impact of 
the aircrafts and abnormally high temperatures due to the fuel explosion, collapse of 
the towers, prolonged exposure to different weather conditions, fire and water, as well 
as the use of heavy equipment in the recovery effort”); Mitchell M. Holland et al., 
Development of a Quality, High Throughput DNA Analysis Procedure for Skeletal 
Samples to Assist with the Identification of Victims from the World Trade Center 
Attacks, 44 CROATIAN MED. J. 264, 265 (2003). 
 48 Brenner & Weir, supra note 38, at 177; see also WTC Families for a Proper 
Burial, Inc. v. City of New York, 567 F. Supp. 2d 529, 531 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) 
(“Approximately 1,100 of the victims perished without leaving a trace, utterly 
consumed into incorporeality by the intense, raging fires, or pulverized into dust by the 
massive tons of collapsing concrete and steel.”). 
 49 Biesecker et al., supra note 45, at 1122. Moreover, tissue fragments 
recovered many months after the collapse had deteriorated due to “bacterial and other 
processes . . . .” Id. 
 50 See Shaler & Bode, supra note 46 (noting that despite its status as the 
“largest forensic DNA laboratory in the United States,” the operation “would require 
nonexistent resources . . . .”); Biesecker et al., supra note 45, at 1123 (describing how 
“OCME recognized that its computers and data communication facilities were 
inadequate for this project”). 
 51 Gill et al., supra note 46, at 183. 
 52 Mundorff, supra note 34, at 128. The decision was unprecedented because 
“[i]vestigators in mass fatality events generally do not DNA-test every fragment . . . .” Id. 
 53 See David W. Chen, New Test for 9/11 ID’s is Moving Much Slower than 
Scientists Hoped, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2002, at B3 (noting how the identification “process 
has unfolded far more slowly than anticipated” and OCME had not yet identified remains 
for fifty-one percent of the victims in November 2002). In April of 2002, OCME had 
identified 968 decedents after examining 19,219 remains and by December 2008, 657 
additional victims had been identified. Gill et al., supra note 46, at 186. 
 54 Shaler & Bode, supra note 46; see also Biesecker et al., supra note 45, at 
1122 (noting that the conditions at WTC “made it difficult to isolate and genotype the 
DNA from the specimens”); Amy Z. Mundorff et al., DNA Preservation in Skeletal 
Elements from the World Trade Center Disaster: Recommendations for Mass Fatality 
Management, 54 J. FORENSIC SCIENCE 739, 739 (2009) (describing how “UV radiation, 
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consisted of thousands of bone fragments and, according to one 
OCME director, a “robust, reliable, and rapid method for extracting 
DNA from bones did not exist” in 2001.55 As of this writing, forty-
one percent of the victims have yet to be even partially identified.56 
OCME currently possesses over 8500 unidentified human 
remains57 out of the nearly 22,000 fragments recovered after the 
towers’ collapse.58 Recent advances in forensic science, however, 
have brought the original forecast closer to fruition.59  
Over time and in cooperation with private industry, 
OCME has developed the ability to extract viable DNA samples 
from bone fragments.60 Ten years later, scientists at OCME 
continue the laborious work of evaluating hundreds of remains 
per month “in an ongoing attempt to match a name to each 
piece of human remains recovered from [the WTC].”61 Whereas 
OCME scientists could only evaluate a few fragments per day 
ten years ago, improved technology now allows them to analyze 
several hundred per month.62 Better techniques for extracting 
viable DNA from miniscule and degraded samples led OCME to 
generate thirty-two new identifications in the last five years.63 
OCME scientists “have utilized these advances to go back and 
retest inconclusive fragments every few years, often succeeding 
where they had previously failed.”64 The improved technology 
has borne fruit. In May and August 2011, OCME successfully 
matched DNA for two previously unidentified WTC victims.65 
  
humidity, moisture, heat, fire, and mold . . . contributed to the advanced state of 
decomposition of the remains and to the degradation of DNA”).  
 55 Shaler & Bode, supra note 46. 
 56 WTC OPERATIONAL STATISTICS, supra note 43.  
 57 The remains consist of “mainly bone fragments but also tissue that has 
been dehydrated for preservation.” Hartocollis, supra note 9. 
 58 See WTC OPERATIONAL STATISTICS, supra note 43.  
 59 See N.Y. Univ. Langone Med. Ctr., A Decade Later, the Office of the Chief 
Medical Examiner Upholds Its Promise to Identify Every Remnant of the Lives Lost in 
the World Trade Center Attacks, NEWS & VIEWS, July-Aug. 2011, at 5 [hereinafter A 
Decade Later]. 
 60 Id. at 5; see also Shaler & Bode, supra note 46 (discussing the development 
and efficacy of coordination with private companies like Bode Technology Group, 
Celera and Orchid Biosciences to develop ever-refined techniques to analyze DNA in 
bone fragments). 
 61 A Decade Later, supra note 59, at 5. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. For a comprehensive review of the scientific processes utilized in the 
WTC identification effort, see generally Mundorff et al., supra note 54; Biesecker et al., 
supra note 45; Holland et al., supra note 47; Budimlija et al., supra note 47.  
 64 A Decade Later, supra note 59, at 5. 
 65 See Al Baker, A 9/11 Victim Is Identified by the Medical Examiner, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 23, 2011, 5:53 PM), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/08/23/a-911-victim-is-
identified-by-the-medical-examiner/; Anemona Hartocollis, First New Identification of 9/11 
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OCME now identifies remains on a daily basis.66 Thus, 
improvements in DNA typing raise the prospect that most, if 
not all, WTC victims will be partially identified.67 It now 
appears, however, that the original goal of identifying every 
single fragment has yielded to a more feasible target: 
identifying each victim.68 Indeed, OCME has publicly 
committed itself to testing the remains until every victim has 
been identified.69 This shift accords with previous mass-disaster 
identification efforts, where “the standard of care is to identify 
each victim, not each remain.”70  
Thus, the families and the City must confront the near-
certain prospect that DNA testing will end without identifying 
all of the WTC remains. Consequently, the question arises as to 
who should determine the final disposition of any residual 
human remains. In Part II, this note examines the existing 
legal framework in New York concerning the disposition of 
human remains in order to determine which party holds the 
power to decide this question.  
II. NEW YORK LAW HAS NOT ADEQUATELY ADDRESSED THE 
DISPOSITION OF UNIDENTIFIED REMAINS 
In dismissing the Regenhard petition,71 the New York 
County Supreme Court wrote that neither the City nor OCME 
was obligated “to seek the families’ input as to where the 
unidentified remains will be located—they are only required to 
disclose the information as to where the remains will be 
located.”72 The court, however, cited no statute, regulation, or 
  
Victim Since 2009, N.Y. TIMES (May 12, 2011, 6:38 PM), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/ 
2011/05/12/first-new-identification-of-911-victim-since-2009/. 
 66 McGinty, supra note 10, at A1. 
 67 A Decade Later, supra note 59, at 5. Dr. Charles Hirsch, Chief Medical 
Examiner recently stated: “This process is not time limited . . . . Ten years ago, we 
promised the victims’ families that we would never quit working to identify every last 
individual who died that day—and we’re going to keep that promise. It’s a sacred 
obligation.” Id. 
 68 See Brenner & Weir, supra note 38, at 177 (concluding that “there is no 
prospect of attaining a closed-system” and setting “a plausible upper bound for the 
eventual number of [WTC victim] identifications” at 2100). 
 69 See Gill et al., supra note 46, at 194; Hartocollis, supra note 65; Letter from 
Charles S. Hirsch, Chief Medical Examiner (Sept. 21, 2006) (on file with author) (“Recent 
advances in the technique for extracting DNA from bone . . . have provided us the 
opportunity to renew our efforts to identify your loved ones. We are working actively on 
World Trade Center identifications, and new identifications will be forthcoming.”). 
 70 Budimlija et al., supra note 47. 
 71 See supra text accompanying notes 23-26. 
 72 Regenhard v. City of New York, No. 109548/2011, slip op. at 7 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. Oct. 25, 2011).  
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case to support that assertion.73 In the following sections, this 
note will analyze the few laws that exist concerning the 
disposition of unidentified remains to determine whether the 
Regenhard court was correct. 
A. Statutes and Cases Governing the Disposition of Human 
Remains 
Both New York State statutes and New York City 
municipal ordinances govern the authority and responsibilities 
of OCME.74 As one court has noted, “the statutory powers and 
discretionary authority of [OCME] are extensive.”75 Pursuant to 
the New York City Charter, Chapter 12, section 557 (Section 
557), OCME is empowered to “provide forensic and related 
testing and analysis . . . in furtherance of investigations 
concerning persons both alive and deceased . . . .”76 Moreover, 
subdivision 557(f) grants OCME the authority to “perform the 
functions of the city mortuary . . . including the removal, 
transportation and disposal of unclaimed or unidentified human 
remains . . . .”77 Thus, OCME ostensibly holds the legal right to 
determine the final disposition of the WTC unidentified remains. 
Where human remains are identifiable, the statutory 
“person in control of disposition” is entitled to the remains 
upon completion of autopsies, DNA testing, or other authorized 
analysis.78 Absent testamentary direction by the deceased, New 
York Public Health Law (PHL) section 4201 determines the 
person in control of disposition.79 It codifies the common-law 
order of priority,80 beginning with the surviving spouse and 
  
 73 See id.  
 74 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4200 (McKinney 2011); N.Y.C. R. & REGS. 
§ 205.01 (2011). 
 75 Shipley v. City of New York, 908 N.Y.S.2d 425, 430 (App. Div. 2010). 
 76 N.Y.C. CHARTER § 557(f)(3) (Supp. I 2011). 
 77 Id. § 557(f)(2) (emphasis added). 
 78 See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4201(2)(a) (delineating “in descending 
priority [the persons who] shall have the right to control the disposition of the remains 
of such decedent”). 
 79 Id. § 4201(2). 
 80 See, e.g., Secord v. Secor, 18 Abb. N. Cas. 78, 81-82 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1870) 
(“In the absence of a testamentary direction, is it not better that the husband should 
bury the wife, and the wife the husband, than that the door should be opened to an 
unseemly contest between the surviving parent and the next of kin?”); Frank W. 
Grinnell, Legal Rights in the Remains of the Dead, 17 GREEN BAG 345, 347-52 (1905) 
(citing cases explicating the general rule that in the absence of a will, the right to 
determine burial falls to the spouse first, and then descending to the children, 
grandchildren, parents, and siblings). 
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devolving to any surviving children, parents, and siblings.81 
PHL section 4201 further provides that the “person in control 
of disposition . . . shall faithfully carry out the directions of the 
decedent to the extent lawful and practicable . . . in a manner 
appropriate to the moral and individual beliefs and wishes of 
the decedent . . . .”82 Should a dispute arise over the remains’ 
disposition, the statute dictates that it “shall be resolved by a 
court of competent jurisdiction” pursuant to an Article Four 
proceeding under the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules.83 
A New York appellate court evaluated the interplay 
between OCME’s statutory powers and the quasi-property 
right84 in Shipley v. City of New York.85 In that case, an OCME 
medical examiner, while performing an autopsy, removed and 
retained the brain of the plaintiffs’ son and returned the body 
without informing the plaintiffs that their son’s brain was still 
in his possession.86 The parents sued for damages based on a 
quasi-property theory.87 In its defense, OCME contended that 
“the common-law right of sepulcher cannot infringe upon 
[OCME’s] expansive authority . . . to discharge its duties in the 
exercise of its professional discretion.”88 
The court wrote that OCME’s “statutory 
powers[,] . . . [though] extensive[,] . . . [are] not unlimited.”89 
The state law governing disposition, autopsy, and dissection of 
cadavers, said the court, “reflects [the] concerns for respecting 
the corporal remains of decedents and protecting the feelings of 
family members by strictly limiting the circumstances under 
which autopsies may be performed.”90 Specifically, PHL 
section 4215 “safeguards the rights of the next of kin to 
receive [the] remains for burial” once the “legitimate purposes 
of an autopsy have been satisfied . . . .”91 That is, under the 
court’s interpretation, section 4215 “implicitly acknowledges” the 
common-law quasi-property right to possess the remains.92 By 
  
 81 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4201 (2)(a)(i-v). Cf. N.Y.C. R. & REGS. § 205.01 (2011). 
 82 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4201(2)(c). 
 83 Id. § 4201(8). 
 84 See infra Part III. 
 85 908 N.Y.S.2d 425, 429-31 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010). 
 86 Id. at 427. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. at 429. 
 89 Id. at 430. 
 90 Id. (alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. The statute at the time read:  
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mandating the return of the human remains, the statute 
“strikes an appropriate balance between fulfillment of the 
legitimate scientific and investigative duties of [OCME] and the 
recognition of the long-established rights of next of kin to receive 
and provide final repose to the remains of their loved ones.”93 
Since the medical examiner in Shipley had no further legitimate 
need to retain the decedent’s brain, the court concluded that 
plaintiffs had a valid cause of action against OCME.94 
Whereas Shipley involved the removal of an identifiable 
brain from a corpse, Comite en Memorial del Vuelo 587 Inc. v. 
Hirsch concerned a quasi-property action over commingled and 
unidentified remains.95 In Hirsch, which preceded Shipley by five 
years, the Comite en Memoria del Vuelo 587 Inc. (the 
Committee), representing the families of the victims of American 
Airlines Flight 587 (Flight 587),96 filed a mandamus action to 
compel OCME to bury the victims’ unidentified remains.97 
OCME had identified partial remains for all 265 victims but 
could not identify 308 residual fragments through DNA testing.98 
When the families discovered that OCME intended to inter 
these residual remains in a “nondescript common burial 
ground,” they objected vociferously. Instead, the families 
proposed that OCME bury the unidentified remains in a private 
cemetery chosen by the relatives.99  
The Committee had held a meeting of family members 
representing 100 of the crash victims, who approved by 
majority vote a plan to entomb the remains at Trinity 
Cemetery in New York City.100 However, several families that 
did not participate in the vote objected and submitted a letter 
to OCME complaining that the vote was flawed.101 In response, 
  
In all cases in which a dissection has been made, the provisions of this 
article, requiring the burial or other lawful disposition of a body of a deceased 
person, and the provisions of law providing for the punishment of interference 
with or injuries to it, apply equally to the remains of the body after dissection 
as soon as the lawful purposes of such dissection have been accomplished.  
Id. (emphasis added) (quoting N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4215(1)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 93 Id. at 431. 
 94 Id. at 427. 
 95 Comite en Memoria del Vuelo 587 Inc. v. Hirsch, No. 100382/2005, slip op. 
at 1, 3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 26, 2005). 
 96 See supra note 34. 
 97 Hirsch, No. 100382/2005, slip op. at 1. 
 98 See id. at 2. 
 99 See Verified Petition, supra note 34, at 3. 
 100 See id. at 5-6. 
 101 See id. at 7. 
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the medical examiner’s office announced that it would not 
release the remains without either unanimous consent from 
the surviving next of kin or a court order.102 
In its supporting briefs, the Committee stressed that it 
was not “seeking custody and control of the unidentified 
remains or that they be released to it.”103 Rather, it contended 
that OCME, as legal custodian, was required to transfer the 
remains to Trinity Cemetery as there was no longer any 
investigative reason to withhold the remains.104 OCME, claimed 
the Committee, had an “affirmative and non-discretionary 
duty,” under PHL section 4200,105 to ensure that the remains 
received a “decent burial within a reasonable time after the 
crash of Flight 587.”106 Since the families had already voted for 
the Trinity location, a “decent burial” consisted of complying 
with their referendum.107 
In response, OCME justified its decision to delay 
disposing of the unidentified remains based on “continuous, 
contentious and significant dissent among groups of next of 
kin . . . .”108 Even so, OCME contended that it had no obligation 
to seek input from the victims’ families. Under the Rules of the 
City of New York, Title 24, subsection 205.01(d), OCME 
conceded, it would normally be required to release human 
remains to the next of kin.109 But in the case of unidentifiable 
remains, there were no identifiable next of kin for purposes of 
the statute.110 In this situation, OCME “maintains custody and 
control over the remains” and, accordingly, “it is within the 
discretion of OCME to dispose of the remains in an appropriate 
manner to be determined by OCME.”111 
  
 102 See id. 
 103 See Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of the Application of Petitioner 
Comite en Memoria del Vuelo 587 Inc. at 2, Hirsch, No. 100382/2005 [hereinafter Reply 
Memorandum of Law] (emphasis omitted). 
 104 See id. at 2. 
 105 Hirsch, No. 100382/2005, slip op. at 1. New York Public Health Law 
Section 4200(1) provides that “[e]xcept in the cases in which a right to dissect it is 
expressly conferred by law, every body of a deceased person, within this state, shall be 
decently buried or incinerated within a reasonable time after death.” N.Y. PUB. 
HEALTH LAW § 4200(1) (McKinney 2011). 
 106 Hirsch, No. 100382/2005, slip op. at 1 (emphasis omitted). 
 107 See Reply Memorandum of Law, supra note 103, at 2. 
 108 See Respondent’s Memorandum of Law in Support of the Verified Answer 
at 3, Hirsch, No. 100382/2005.  
 109 Id. at 3-4. 
 110 Id. at 4.  
 111 Id. 
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The court denied the petition and dismissed the suit on 
multiple grounds.112 First, the court held that the Committee 
lacked standing because it could not demonstrate that it was 
“the appropriate entity to act as the representative of the 
interests” of all the next of kin.113 The Committee’s Trinity 
Cemetery proposal, ratified by a majority vote of the 
representatives of only 100 victims, could not be said to 
represent the majority will of the representatives of all 265 
victims.114 Furthermore, the court found no “safeguards” in place 
“to protect the interests” of the non-voting families.115 Any 
decisions about the remains’ disposition, ruled the court, 
required “direct participation” by the “appropriate” next of kin.116 
The court also addressed the merits of the petition, 
holding that the plaintiffs had failed to state a legally 
cognizable claim.117 The court correctly noted, like in Shipley, 
that the pertinent statutes “make it clear that, if there were no 
further investigatory reason for [OCME] to retain remains of 
an identified decedent, the [medical examiner] is obligated to 
promptly release such remains . . . upon the demand of the 
decedent’s next of kin.”118 But the court distinguished an 
identified decedent from the remains in the case at bar: 
[N]either of the parties has cited (nor has the court’s own research 
revealed) any case, statute, rule or regulation which deals 
specifically with a situation where human remains are unable to be 
identified . . . . Under the current circumstances and apparently 
without regulatory or statutory guidance, the OCME has established 
a suitable procedure to obtain direction for the disposition of remains 
from the victims’ next of kin as they become identified . . . .119 
The “suitable procedure” that the court referred to was 
OCME’s policy of providing a “Release Authorization” to any 
families wishing to claim remains identified in the future.120 The 
release “gave the next of kin the choice of claiming any remains 
identified in the future or authorizing the OCME to dispose of 
  
 112 The court dismissed the proceeding on three separate grounds. First, the 
Committee lacked standing. Hirsch, No. 100382/2005, slip op. at 2-3. Second, the 
Committee failed to join all necessary parties. Finally, the Committee failed to state a 
legal claim for relief. Id. at 2-4. 
 113 Id. at 2-3.  
 114 Id. at 3.  
 115 Id.  
 116 Id.  
 117 Id.  
 118 Id. 
 119 Id. at 3-4. 
 120 Id. at 2. 
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such remains as deemed appropriate by the OCME.”121 Under 
such a procedure, the families were faced with the unenviable 
choice between assigning away their rights to the remains and 
waiting for piecemeal identifications conditioned upon advances 
in DNA testing. Had the Committee vote represented a majority 
of the 265 victims’ representatives here, under the court’s ruling 
the vote still would not have been binding unless every legal 
representative had participated. While the latter requirement 
supposedly safeguards the interests of all the families, it 
effectively precludes collective decisions over the disposition of 
unidentified remains. Paradoxically, because the court reasoned 
that “decisions to be made with respect to the interment of the 
remains of a loved one are so highly personal,” none get to decide 
unless all decide.122 
In the Memorial case,123 OCME has likewise provided 
release authorization forms to the victims’ next of kin. The 
responses have varied: “Some families retrieve[d] new remains 
right away, conducting small ceremonies and reopening graves to 
bury them. Some [have] wait[ed] for years, and are still waiting, 
in order to collect them all at once. Families of about 150 victims 
have asked not to be notified at all.”124 Unless relatives inform 
OCME that they do not wish to be notified temporarily or 
permanently, they “will continue to receive calls for as long as 
[OCME], aided by advancing technology, makes identifications.”125 
Two years after Hirsch was decided, the New York City 
Council amended Section 557,126 subdivision (f),127 thus granting 
OCME the authority to “perform the functions of the city 
mortuary . . . including the removal, transportation and 
disposal of unclaimed or unidentified human remains . . . .”128 
The legislative record reveals that the amendments were 
viewed as mere housekeeping measures updating the New 
York City Charter to reflect responsibilities that OCME had 
  
 121 Id. (citation omitted). 
 122 Id. at 3.  
 123 See supra note 33. 
 124 McGinty, supra note 10, at A1. 
 125 Id. 
 126 See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text. 
 127 NEW YORK CITY, N.Y., LOCAL LAW NO. 53 (2007), available at 
http://legistar.council.nyc.gov/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=447342&GUID=7EB32EF2-
59DF-401E-889B-D8B96EBDBD1D&Options=ID%7cText%7c&Search=medical+examiner 
(follow “Local Law” hyperlink under “Attachments”) (last visited Oct. 30, 2012). 
 128 Id. The current Charter contains the exact same language. See N.Y.C. 
CHARTER § 557(f)(2) (Supp. I 2011).  
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already been performing.129 In other words, the Council rubber-
stamped the proposed language without considering, or even 
contemplating, its scope or consequences.130  
As the preceding analysis demonstrates, unidentified 
remains exist in a legal limbo. Until a fragment is identified, the 
families have no right to determine its disposition and OCME 
has no legal duty to release it. And under the black letter law, 
OCME may dispose of unidentified remains even where the next 
of kin wish to claim them.131 If the dissenting families end up 
litigating the WTC remains, the courts would have to determine 
whether Section 557 precludes the next of kin from claiming 
unidentified remains in OCME’s possession. Sparse case law 
exists interpreting Section 557, but in a prior case concerning 
WTC remains, the court suggested that the next of kin have no 
proprietary interest in unidentified remains, and thus no legal 
authority to determine the manner of disposal.132 
  
 129 See Transcript of the Minutes of the Committee on Health at 3, Council of 
the City of New York (Oct. 11, 2007) [hereinafter Health Committee Transcript], 
available at http://legistar.council.nyc.gov/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=447342&GUID= 
7EB32EF2-59DF-401E-889B-D8B96EBDBD1D&Options=ID%7cText%7c&Search= 
medical+examiner (statement of Joel Rivera, Chairman, Comm. on Health) (“This 
legislation would update the law to reflect changes in technology and increase 
responsibilities that [OCME] has taken on over time.”); Press Release, Office of 
Communications, Council of the City of New York, Updating Responsibilities of Office  
of the Chief Medical Examiner (Oct. 17, 2007), available at 
http://legistar.council.nyc.gov/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=447342&GUID=7EB32EF2-
59DF-401E-889B-D8B96EBDBD1D&Options=ID%7cText%7c&Search=medical+examiner 
(“The Council is also voting on legislation to amend the City Charter to reflect new 
responsibilities of the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner (OCME). Due to 
restructuring and advances in technology OCME has taken on new duties that are not 
reflected in the Charter, such as performing the functions of City mortuaries, and 
conducting DNA and other forensic testing. These will now be codified as formal 
responsibilities of OCME.”). 
 130 The only testimony the Committee on Health heard was from a single 
OMCE representative, who read from a prepared statement. See Health Committee 
Transcript, supra note 129, at 5-8. The only mention of unidentified remains in the 
statement was a description of how OCME was responsible for “transporting and 
storing the remains of unidentified people and unclaimed people. Id. at 6-7. After the 
testimony, Committee chairperson opined, “I think this is just a common sense process 
that we’re going through right now.” Id. at 9. He then opened the floor to the other 
committee members, who asked no questions. See id. 
 131 N.Y.C. CHARTER § 557(f)(3).  
 132 See WTC Families for a Proper Burial, Inc. v. City of New York, 567 F. 
Supp. 2d 529, 537 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff’d, 359 F. App’x 177 (2d Cir. 2009). 
248 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78:1 
B. The Precursor Case to the Memorial Litigation: WTC 
Families for a Proper Burial, Inc. v. City of New York 
Finds No Property Interest in Intangible and 
Unidentifiable Human Remains 
On September 12, 2001, the City began relocating the 
WTC debris to Fresh Kills, the inveterate garbage dump located 
in Staten Island, so that federal and local officials could begin 
the colossal task of scrutinizing the wreckage for evidence and 
human remains.133 The initial, ad-hoc process for prospecting 
remains by rake and shovel evolved over ten months to 
increasingly sophisticated screening mechanisms whereby 
480,000 tons of commingled organic and inorganic materials 
were sifted through screens less than one-quarter inch thick.134 
The miniscule pieces passing through these screens, referred to 
as “fines,” included cremated remains of WTC victims.135  
Families of the victims earnestly believed that City 
officials had promised to segregate the fines containing human 
remains from the residual waste stored at the landfill, in order 
to accord dignity to the memory of the victims and ensure that 
the remains would ultimately receive a proper burial.136 In 
September 2004, however, several family members visited 
Fresh Kills and discovered that sanitation employees had been 
commingling the fines with household garbage and consigning 
the mixture underneath a layer of earth.137 After failing to 
convince the City to remedy the purported wrong,138 some of the 
families established a nonprofit corporation139 in order to 
effectuate a proper burial site for the fines. The corporation 
subsequently filed a lawsuit140 in federal district court to compel 
  
 133 WTC Families, 567 F. Supp. 2d at 532; Amended Complaint at ¶¶ 28-30, 
WTC Families, 567 F. Supp. 2d 529 (No. 05CV7243). 
 134 Amended Complaint, supra note 133, ¶¶ 31-40. 
 135 Id. ¶¶ 42-46. 
 136 Id. ¶¶ 47-49; WTC Families, 567 F. Supp. 2d at 533. 
 137 Amended Complaint, supra note 133, ¶¶ 51-53; WTC Families, 567 F. 
Supp. 2d at 534. 
 138 Amended Complaint, supra note 133, ¶¶ 55-63. 
 139 World Trade Center Families for a Proper Burial, Inc. was incorporated in 
2003 and professed to act on behalf of nearly 1000 families whose loved ones perished 
at the WTC. See WTC Families, 567 F. Supp. 2d at 533 (noting that the nonprofit was 
incorporated “with the stated purposes of representing the bereaved families, 
retrieving the remains of 9/11 victims located at Fresh Kills, and providing a proper 
burial and resting place for the remains”); Amended Complaint, supra note 133, ¶¶ 5-6. 
 140 The Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act of 2001 grants 
the United States Court for the Southern District of New York “original and exclusive 
jurisdiction over all actions brought for any claim (including any claim for loss of 
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the City to reclaim the cremated fines, remove them from Fresh 
Kills, and establish a cemetery for their final resting place.141 
In WTC Families for a Proper Burial, Inc. v. City of New 
York, the plaintiff families claimed that the City violated the 
Due Process Clause (DPC) of the Fourteenth Amendment, 42 
U.S.C. § 1983, and New York State law “by depriving [them] of 
their rights over the remains of their deceased relatives, 
including their right to provide a proper and decent burial for 
their deceased family members.”142 Plaintiffs argued that their 
quasi-property rights to the victims’ remains were entitled to 
DPC protection under federal law. Neither federal nor state 
law, according to plaintiffs, distinguished cremated remains 
from an intact body.143 Accordingly, the families retained a 
proprietary right to the “body parts, bone fragments, small 
tissue particles and cremated remains” at Fresh Kills.144 Having 
assumed responsibility for the recovery effort, the City “owed 
[the families] a duty of reasonable care to insure that such 
recovery effort was properly done.”145  
The City moved to dismiss the suit, contending that the 
DPC did not impose “an obligation to search and sift the WTC 
material in any particular manner.”146 In its briefs, the City 
argued that while no Second Circuit or New York State court 
had yet considered whether the quasi-property right in the 
deceased’s remains rises to the level of a DPC-protected property 
interest,147 the case at bar should nevertheless be dismissed 
because plaintiffs could not demonstrate that identifiable 
remains were present at the landfill.148 In other words, the family 
  
property, personal injury, or death) resulting from or relating to the terrorist-related 
aircraft crashes of September 11, 2001.” Pub. L. No. 107-42, 115 Stat. 230 (2001). 
 141 WTC Families, 567 F. Supp. 2d at 532; see also Anemona Hartocollis, 
Landfill Has 9/11 Remains, Medical Examiner Wrote, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2007, at B3 
(describing how “family members are trying to force the city to separate many 
thousands of tons of debris that they believe still includes body parts and other human 
remains from the landfill, and to create a formal burial place for them”). 
 142 Amended Complaint, supra note 133, ¶¶ 68-95. Plaintiffs also alleged a 
cause of action, inapposite for purposes of this note, for violation of their right to free 
exercise of religion because the City purportedly prevented the families from burying 
their loved ones according to their religious tenets. See id. ¶¶ 81-84. 
 143 Id. ¶ 3. 
 144 Id. 
 145 Id. ¶ 8. 
 146 Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Motion to Dismiss 
the Amended Complaint or in the Alternative for Partial Summary Judgment, at 3, 
WTC Families, 567 F. Supp. 2d 529 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (No. 05CV7243) [hereinafter 
Defendants’ Memorandum of Law]. 
 147 See infra Part III. 
 148 Defendants’ Memorandum of Law, supra note 146, at 28-29. 
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members, at most, could only prove that “the remains of some 
undifferentiated and unspecified victims of the WTC disaster” 
may have been commingled with the debris at Fresh Kills.149  
Mindful of the families’ irreparable emotional anguish, 
the court nevertheless held that plaintiffs had failed to state a 
legally cognizable claim and dismissed the suit.150 The court 
recognized that New York common law grants the next of kin 
the right to possess, and determine the final disposition of, a 
decedent’s remains.151 The court, however, qualified that right 
as constituting something less than “a property right in the 
ordinary sense of the term . . . .”152 Rather, it “extends only as 
far as necessary to entitle the next of kin to protection from 
violation or invasion of the place of burial, and to protect the 
next of kin’s right to ensure a proper burial.”153  
Moreover, the court found the quasi-property right 
operative only in cases where the next of kin claim possession 
over “identifiable, recoverable bodies . . . .”154 Neither the 
plaintiffs nor the court itself could find a case which extended 
“such a right to an undifferentiated mass of dirt that may or 
may not contain undetectable traces of human remains not 
identifiable to any particular human being.”155 Accordingly, the 
court concluded that “[w]ithout something tangible or 
identifiable, there is no property right.”156 And without a 
property right, the DPC claim must fail: 
[T]his case concerns a total and complete absence of identifiable 
remains of any identifiable person. And just as that crucial fact was 
fatal to plaintiffs’ Constitutional claims, it is fatal as well to 
plaintiffs’ state law claims . . . . [W]ithout identified remains of an 
identifiable deceased, there is no person, or part of a person, and 
there can be no right, to bury . . . . [P]laintiffs have no property right 
in an undifferentiated, unidentifiable mass of dirt that may or may 
not contain the remains of plaintiffs’ loved ones.157 
  
 149 Id. at 29. 
 150 WTC Families, 567 F. Supp. 2d at 534. 
 151 Id. at 537 (citing Colavito v. N.Y. Donor Network, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 2d 
237, 243 (E.D.N.Y. 2005)). 
 152 WTC Families, 567 F. Supp. 2d at 537. 
 153 Id. 
 154 Id. 
 155 Id.  
 156 Id. (emphasis added) (citing Comite en Memoria del Vuelo 587 Inc. v. 
Hirsch, No. 100382/2005, slip op. at 3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 26, 2005)). 
 157 Id. at 541-42. 
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WTC Families cited Hirsch for the proposition that 
there can be no property interest in unidentifiable remains.158 
As precedent for that assertion, Hirsch is dubious at best. The 
Hirsch court merely concluded that no case law, statute, or 
regulation directly deals with a situation where OCME 
possesses yet-to-be-identified remains.159 The Memorial case 
presents an opportunity for the New York courts to reconsider 
whether Hirsch and WTC Families remain good law. 
The facts of the Memorial case are distinguishable from 
WTC Families in one major respect. There is no doubt that 
OCME possesses WTC victims’ remains, whereas in WTC 
Families, the court made a factual determination that “all 
human remains that could be identified, were identified. Only 
dust remains.”160 That is, the WTC Families court rested its 
decision partly on the fact that there was no concrete proof that 
the fines contained human remains at all. No such ambiguity 
exists in the Memorial case.  
Thus, the courts may have the opportunity to decide 
whether the quasi-property right embraces tangible and 
potentially-but-not-currently-identifiable human remains. 
While the courts can easily avoid settling this issue on any 
number of technicalities,161 this note argues that the courts, and 
ultimately the legislature, should directly confront this issue. 
III. THE QUASI-PROPERTY RIGHT IN CORPSES 
If the dissenting families are to succeed in challenging 
the City’s plan to transfer the unidentified remains to the 
Memorial repository, they must establish a legal basis for their 
authority to determine the final disposition of the remains held 
by OCME. That necessarily entails proving that the next of kin 
have a quasi-property right to the remains. Within the quasi-
property right: 
[T]he law has recognized in the kin having the duty of burial a right 
to possession of the body so that the duty can be carried out. This is 
a right to receive possession of the body immediately and in the 
same condition it was in at the time of death. There is also a 
correlative duty imposed upon anyone who may have the possession 
  
 158 Id. at 537. 
 159 Hirsch, No. 100382/2005, slip op. at 3. 
 160 WTC Families, 567 F. Supp. 2d at 532. 
 161 See Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477, 480 (6th Cir. 1991) (describing 
how courts “confronted with determining the nature of the [quasi-property] right have 
avoided characterizing it” as property and settled suits on other grounds). 
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not to mutilate the body and to deliver possession. The right to 
possession of the body exists only in order to aid the accomplishment 
of the duty of burial and, therefore, should only be co-extensive with 
that duty.162 
While a surviving spouse or relative may not have the 
same property interest in a dead body as he or she would in a 
house or automobile, he or she does have a proprietary right to 
exclusive possession of a corpse for the purpose of burial.163 In 
the proceeding sections, this note will survey the origin and 
scope of the modern quasi-property right to determine whether 
it embraces unidentified human remains. 
A. What Is Property? 
The meaning of the quasi-property interest in a dead 
body lacks consistency.164 According to one recent commentator, 
“The right to burial is an academic subject which could 
encompass several volumes . . . .”165 Proprietary rights to 
corpses are nonexistent in some jurisdictions but are expansive 
in others.166 Courts have held body parts to be both protected 
and unprotected as a property of sorts under the Due Process 
Clause.167 To understand what it means to have a quasi-
property right in a dead body, it is necessary to contrast the 
right from general conceptions of property.  
Under the prevailing scholarly view,168 property is 
viewed as a metaphorical bundle of rights, with each stick or 
twig in the bundle representing a right relative to the world at 
  
 162 B. Joan Krauskopf, The Law of Dead Bodies: Impeding Medical Progress, 
19 OHIO ST. L.J. 455, 458 (1958) (citing Finley v. Atl. Transp. Co., 220 N.Y. 249 (1917)). 
 163 Melissa A.W. Stickney, Note, Property Interests in Cadaverous Organs: 
Changes to Ohio Anatomical Gift Law and the Erosion of Family Rights, 17 J.L. & 
HEALTH 37, 43 (2002). 
 164 See Elizabeth E. Appel Blue, Redefining Stewardship over Body Parts, 21 
J.L. & HEALTH 75, 105-06 (2008) (noting that “currently, there is no consensus in the 
courts over how to treat bodies . . . [and] the law of the body remains in a state of 
confusion and chaos” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 165 Tomkins, supra note 36, at 94. 
 166 See Appel Blue, supra note 164, at 106 (finding that “American 
jurisdictions are today divided between the ‘no property’ jurisdictions and the ‘quasi-
property’ jurisdictions, with each side claiming a majority”). 
 167 For cases finding a Due Process Clause entitlement in a dead body, see 
Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477 (6th Cir. 1991), and Newman v. 
Sathyavaglswaran, 287 F.3d 786 (9th Cir. 2002). For cases rejecting due process 
claims, see Fuller v. Marx, 724 F.2d 717 (8th Cir. 1984), and Lawyer v. Kernodle, 721 
F.2d 632 (8th Cir. 1983). 
 168 See Stickney, supra note 163, at 42 (describing how property “has been broadly 
defined as consisting of a bundle of rights, an analogy the Supreme Court has employed a 
number of times” (citing Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979))). 
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large.169 “Property,” therefore, has a legal meaning distinct from 
its pedestrian connotation, and “has been described as an 
aggregation of a person’s legally protected expectations in 
regard to a [thing].”170 The right to a thing, commonly labeled 
an entitlement, is traditionally dichotomized as either a 
property right or personal right.171 The former defines an 
“entitlement to a certain thing (proprietary rights in rem) and 
the law protects this entitlement against the world as a 
whole.”172 The latter defines an “entitlement which is 
enforceable against a specific person or a specific class of 
persons (rights in personam), such as those which result from 
obligations like liability in tort or contractual entitlements.”173 
The right to something in rem is stronger than an in personam 
right because it protects the “property” of the “owner” from a 
larger, indefinite class of persons.174 
Legal niceties aside, property simply can be understood 
as rights that the government guarantees and enforces through 
the courts.175 Some of the most prominent rights include “the 
rights of possession, exclusion, use, and disposition, the right to 
enjoy fruits or profits, and the right of destruction.”176 For courts 
to recognize a property interest, “the party must have a 
sufficient number of the ‘twigs’ in the property bundle, though 
not the complete bundle. There is, however, no bright-line test 
for determining the threshold amount of ‘twigs’ necessary to 
establish a property interest.”177 But does the quasi-property 
right contain enough of these twigs for the WTC families to 
“own” the unidentified remains? 
  
 169 See, e.g., NILS HOPPE, BIOEQUITY—PROPERTY AND THE HUMAN BODY 49 (2009). 
 170 Michael H. Scarmon, Brotherton v. Cleveland: Property Rights in the Human 
Body—Are the Goods Oft Interred with Their Bones?, 37 S.D. L. REV. 429, 429 (1991). 
 171 See HOPPE, supra note 169, at 70. 
 172 Id. 
 173 Id. 
 174 See generally THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, THE OXFORD 
INTRODUCTIONS TO U.S. LAW: PROPERTY 9 (2010) (“Because the [in rem] right attaches 
to the object, rather than to particular people, it is universally binding on all who 
encounter the object.”).  
 175 See Roy Hardiman, Toward the Right of Commerciality: Recognizing Property 
Rights in the Commercial Value of Human Tissue, 34 UCLA L. REV. 207, 215 (1986). 
 176 Erik S. Jaffe, Note, “She’s Got Bette Davis[’s] Eyes”: Assessing the 
Nonconsensual Removal of Cadaver Organs Under the Takings and Due Process 
Clauses, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 528, 549 (1990). 
 177 Stickney, supra note 163, at 43. 
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B. Historical Origin of the American Quasi-Property Right 
English common law, inherited by the American colonies, 
did not recognize a human corpse as property.178 Instead, a dead 
body was considered “nullius in bonis,” the property of no one.179 
Authority over human remains belonged to ecclesiastical courts, 
which “monopolized the judicial power over the subject of 
burial . . . .”180 As a result of this jurisdictional peculiarity, family 
members had “no property interest in the body or ashes of an 
ancestor,” and thus no legal remedy “for disturbance of a 
corpse.”181 This led to an absurd result, whereby surviving next of 
kin could sue for things like defacing the headstone but not for 
exhuming the body from the grave.182 
When the United States severed political ties with its 
colonial master, the states jettisoned ecclesiastical jurisdiction.183 
As a consequence, states were free to develop autonomous 
property rules concerning corpses.184 Most repudiated the 
perceived injustices of the English system,185 first by granting 
jurisdiction over dead bodies in courts of law.186 Ensuing familial 
disputes led courts to reconsider whether someone could validly 
claim that a dead body was his property. Empowered with 
jurisdiction, several courts began to modify the no-property-in-a-
corpse rule.187  
  
 178 See Larson v. Chase, 50 N.W. 238, 238-39 (Minn. 1891). 
 179 See id. at 239 (citing Lord Coke, Third Part of the Institutes of the Law of 
England, 3 CO. INST. 203 (1797)). 
 180 R.P. Taylor, Right of Sepulture, 53 AM. L. REV. 359, 359-60 (1919); see also 
Pettigrew v. Pettigrew, 56 A. 878 (Pa. 1904); Pierce v. Proprietors of Swan Point Cemetery, 
10 R.I. 227, 238 (1872); Ritter v. Couch, 76 S.E. 428 (W. Va. 1912); Denay L. Wilding 
Knope, Comment, Over My Dead Body: How the Albrecht Decisions Complicate the 
Constitutional Dilemma of Due Process & the Dead, 41 U. TOL. L. REV. 169, 176 (2009). 
 181 Wilding Knope, supra note 180, at 175-76. 
 182 See id.; cf. In re Widening of Beekman St., 4 Brad. Sur. 503, 519-20 (N.Y. 1857). 
 183 See, e.g., REMIGIUS N. NWABUEZE, BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE CHALLENGE 
OF PROPERTY 46 (2007); Tanya K. Hernández, The Property of Death, 60 U. PITT. L. 
REV. 971, 993 (1999); Knope, supra note 180, at 175-76. 
 184 See Stickney, supra note 163, at 41. 
 185 See Wilding Knope, supra note 180, at 176 (describing how American 
courts, “[l]acking ecclesiastic influence and disliking the potential injustice that the no-
property system created . . . , devised a way around the rule, and . . . assumed 
jurisdiction over dead bodies” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); cf. 
Pettigrew, 56 A. at 879; Pierce, 10 R.I. at 235-39; Ritter, 76 S.E. at 430. 
 186 Larson v. Chase, 50 N.W. 238, 238 (Minn. 1891). 
 187 Id. One court went as far as holding that “the bodies of the dead belong to 
the surviving relations . . . as property, and that they have the right to dispose of them 
as such, within restrictions analogous to those by which the disposition of other 
property may be regulated.” Bogert v. City of Indianapolis, 13 Ind. 134, 138 (1859) 
(emphasis added). 
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[S]ome American courts [started] to recognize a right to possession of 
a body for burial, which they recognized as a property right of sorts. 
Eventually, recognizing that property might not be the best 
description of the right to a corpse for burial, some courts in the 
United States articulated a hybrid term they called quasi-property 
which gave families and friends a right to claim a corpse to effect a 
burial, but not for any other reason . . . .188 
The judiciary, however, did not stray far from the 
English no-property rule; almost no early American courts 
seemed willing to view a corpse as property “in the common 
commercial sense of that term.”189 Instead, the courts came up 
with the concept of “quasi-property,” which gave the next of kin 
the right to “possession of a dead body for the purposes of 
decent burial.”190  
C. The Quasi-Property Right Is an In Rem Property Interest 
The quasi-property right was not created in a vacuum. 
It is not a static concept but has evolved in response to 
“changed conditions of society” and scientific advances.191 The 
first incarnation, from the mid- to late-nineteenth century, 
arose from exhumations and internecine familial disputes over 
the burial locus.192 Ecclesiastical jurisdiction having been 
discarded, the courts placed a duty upon the next of kin to 
ensure that decedents were properly and timely buried. The 
courts, therefore, conferred a corresponding legal right upon 
the survivors in order to reinforce this obligation and protect 
  
 188 Appel Blue, supra note 164, at 106. 
 189 Larson, 50 N.W. at 239-40. 
 190 Id. at 238-39 (holding that a widow “had the legal right to the custody of 
[her husband’s] body for the purposes of preservation, preparation, and burial” and 
could maintain a cause of action for the defendant’s unlawful dissection of the 
husband’s cadaver); see also Pierce, 10 R.I. at 242 (holding that although “the body is 
not property in the usually recognized sense of the word, [it may be considered] as a 
sort of quasi property, to which certain persons may have rights”); but see Bogert, 13 
Ind. at 138 (holding that dead bodies belong to the next of kin “as property”). 
 191 Foley v. Phelps, 37 N.Y.S. 471, 473 (App. Div. 1896) (noting “the obdurate 
common-law rule has been very much relaxed, and changed conditions of society, and 
the necessity for enforcing that protection which is due to the dead, have induced 
courts to re-examine the grounds upon which the common-law rule reposed, and have 
led to modifications of its stringency”); see also Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477, 
481 (6th Cir. 1991) (explaining that “[t]he importance of establishing rights in a dead 
body has been, and will continue to be, magnified by scientific advancements”). 
 192 See, e.g., Bogert, 13 Ind. at 135 (concerning illegal interment of a dead body 
in a municipal cemetery); In re Donn, 14 N.Y.S. 189, 190-91 (Sup. Ct. 1891); Wynkoop 
v. Wynkoop, 42 Pa. 293, 293 (1862) (adjudicating an appeal challenging injunction 
barring appellant from relocating decedent’s remains to another cemetery); Pierce, 10 
R.I. at 228, 243. 
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the repose of the dead.193 Absent a legal right and remedy, the 
criminal law punished the intermeddler and the civil law taxed 
the vandal, but the survivor would be powerless to reinter the 
body.194 Thus, in In re Donn,195 the court explained that unless 
the next of kin received the right to possess and control “the 
body of their deceased relative, it might be left unprotected: 
and in case a corpse should be found in the possession of one 
who had invaded the grave and disinterred it, they would be 
powerless to reclaim it.”196 The courts could adhere to the no-
property rule because a corpse had no pecuniary value at that 
time.197 There was simply no other path for a dead body to take 
other than directly to the cemetery. Consequently, the courts 
saw no calamitous ramifications to labeling a body as a 
property of sorts, because it easily settled internecine disputes 
among families as to who should control death.198 The courts 
granted an in rem interest which they enforced through 
equitable remedies like injunctions.199 
The late-nineteenth century, however, saw an 
“outpouring” of New York cases litigating rights to cadavers as 
a result of modern conditions and scientific innovation.200 First, 
the transformation of kinship and “loosened family ties” led to 
contests over control of the decedent’s remains, often between a 
man’s widow and his children.201 Second, cremation gradually 
became a preferred alternative to interment and the next of kin 
brought suits against the deceased’s testator challenging such 
a disposition of the body.202 Finally, the demand for human 
cadavers for medical research led enterprising individuals to 
  
 193 See In re Donn, 14 N.Y.S. at 190. 
 194 See In re Widening of Beekman St., 4 Brad. Sur. 503, 522, 530 (N.Y. 1857). 
 195 In re Donn, 14 N.Y.S. at 189. 
 196 Id. at 190. 
 197 In re Beekman St., 4 Brad. Sur. at 529 (“[M]uch of the apparent difficulty of 
this subject arises from a false and needless assumption, in holding that nothing is 
property that has not a pecuniary value. The real question is not of the disposable, 
marketable value of a corpse, or its remains, as an article of traffic, but it is of the 
sacred and inherent right to its custody, in order to decently bury it, and secure its 
undisturbed repose.”). 
 198 See, e.g., Weld v. Walker, 130 Mass. 422 (1881); Wynkoop v. Wynkoop, 42 
Pa. 293 (1862); Pierce v. Proprietors of Swan Point Cemetery, 10 R.I. 227 (1872); 
Secord v. Secor, 18 Abb. N. Cas. 78 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1870). 
 199 See, e.g., Weld, 130 Mass. at 423; Wynkoop, 42 Pa. at 302-03 (reversing 
lower court’s injunction ordering removal of the deceased’s body); Pierce, 10 R.I. at 242-
43; Secord, 18 Abb. N. Cas. at 78, 81. 
 200 In re Johnson’s Estate, 7 N.Y.S.2d 81, 85 (Sur. Ct. 1938).  
 201 Id.; see also Secord, 18 Abb. N. Cas. at 78. 
 202 In re Johnson’s Estate, 7 N.Y.S.2d at 86. 
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engage in the lucrative trade of body snatching.203 In response 
to the cadaver trade, states enacted “anatomy laws” permitting 
medical institutions to dissect certain unclaimed bodies, thus 
mollifying the stringent “common law right to immediate burial 
intact” and relieving the public duty to effectuate a decent 
burial for all deceased persons.204 As “cases involving 
unauthorized mutilations” continued to increase, “courts began 
to recognize an exclusive right of the next of kin to possess and 
control the disposition of the bodies of their dead relatives, the 
violation of which was actionable at law.”205 
In this context, the seminal case of Larson v. Chase 
delineated the quasi-property right quite broadly.206 There, a 
widow brought a civil action for emotional distress resulting 
from the defendant’s illegal dissection of her husband’s body, 
alleging interference with her exclusive right to control the 
body.207 The defendant argued that the suit failed to state a 
claim, since a dead body is not property and mental damages 
could not be sustained without a showing of “actual tangible 
injury to person or property.”208 The court reasoned that a 
person’s right to possession of a corpse “leads necessarily to the 
conclusion that it is his property in the broadest and most 
general sense of that term, viz., something over which the law 
accords him exclusive control.”209 Therefore, despite the fact 
that the widow could not claim damages for pecuniary loss 
resulting from the dissection itself, the court permitted 
compensation for mental suffering because it was a “direct, 
proximate, and natural result” of an interference with the 
widow’s exclusive right to possession.210 
Likewise, in Foley v. Phelps, the New York Appellate 
Division held that a widow could maintain a civil cause of 
action for the unauthorized dissection of her husband’s body.211 
The court wrote that “changed conditions of society, and the 
necessity for enforcing that protection which is due to the dead” 
requires New York courts to reconsider the “obdurate” common 
  
 203 See Nelkin & Andrews, supra note 38, at 263; Wilding Knope, supra note 
180, at 177-78. 
 204 Krauskopf, supra note 162, at 459-60; Nelkin & Andrews, supra note 38, at 263. 
 205 Newman v. Sathyavaglswaran, 287 F.3d 786, 791-92 (9th Cir. 2002).  
 206 Larson v. Chase, 50 N.W. 238, 239-40 (Minn. 1891). 
 207 Id. at 238. 
 208 Id. 
 209 Id. at 239 (emphasis added). 
 210 Id. at 239-40. 
 211 Foley v. Phelps, 37 N.Y.S. 471, 474 (App. Div. 1896). 
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law rule that there was no property interest in a dead body.212 
While the court stopped short of grounding its decision in a full 
property right, it wrote: 
Irrespective of any claim of property, the right which inhered in the 
plaintiff, as . . . [the] nearest relative, was a right to the possession of 
the body for the purpose of burying it . . . . That right of possession is 
a clear legal right . . . . The right is to the possession of the corpse in 
the same condition it was in when death supervened . . . . If this 
right exists, as we think it clearly does, the invasion or violation of it 
furnishes a ground for civil action for damages. It is not a mere idle 
utterance, but a substantial legal principle, that wherever a real 
right is violated a real remedy is afforded by the law.213 
Though the widow had a clear legal right to possess the 
body, there did not appear to be a remedy. Under the common 
law, someone who had a right to immediate possession of an 
item could seek redress of any number of theories, including 
replevin214 and conversion.215 But since the quasi-property right 
was something less than full property, these remedies were 
inapplicable. Instead of finding an in rem right in the next of 
kin, the court ostensibly found an in personam right sounding 
in tort law, allowing the widow to recover damages from the 
defendant for “mental suffering.”216 It is understandable that 
the court would come out this way. Besides the moral 
implications of labeling a body as property, it would be almost 
impossible for the courts to calculate damages for illegal 
dissections or autopsies since bodies had no readily identifiable 
value. If the widow here could not collect damages for 
emotional injury, she would, in effect, have no real remedy for 
violation of her right to possess her husband’s body.  
Larson and Foley are among the first in a long line of 
decisions upholding damages for what has come to be known as 
intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), based on an 
  
 212 Id. at 473. 
 213 Id. at 473-74. 
 214 See 23 N.Y. JUR. 2D Conversion § 90 (2011) (summarizing that an action in 
replevin “is to provide a lawful remedy for one who is lawfully entitled to the 
possession of a chattel that is in the custody of another and who cannot simply take 
possession if, in so doing, a breach of the public peace will ensue”). 
 215 See Colavito v. N.Y. Organ Donor Network, Inc., 8 N.Y.3d 43, 49-50 (2006) 
(“A conversion takes place when someone, intentionally and without authority, 
assumes or exercises control over personal property belonging to someone else, 
interfering with that person’s right of possession.” (citation omitted)). 
 216 Foley, 37 N.Y.S. at 474 (analogizing the quasi-property right to the right to 
vote as “merely a personal right”). 
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underlying quasi-property right to dead bodies.217 The quasi-
property right subsequently sounded predominantly in tort 
law, as opposed to actions like replevin or conversion for 
interference with a possessory right.218 As such, the policy 
undergirding the quasi-property right came to be understood as 
merely protecting the emotional sensibilities of the decedent’s 
family.219 Accordingly, this right has garnered considerable 
criticism. One commentator notes that this “dubious ‘property 
right’ . . . cannot be conveyed, can be used only for the one 
purpose of burial, and not only has no pecuniary value but is a 
source of liability for funeral expenses.”220 Another critic 
contends that the purported property interest is a “legal fiction 
to fashion a remedy” for sympathetic plaintiffs.221 
Contrary to the scholarly criticism, the availability of 
emotional damages actually demonstrates how robust the 
quasi-property right is and the extent to which courts “have 
been jealous to protect and enforce” it.222 IIED damages became 
predominant in quasi-property suits not because the right is 
spurious or merely a “convenient hook upon which liability is 
hung,”223 but rather because the “property” at issue was a dead 
body. For moral and practical reasons, a corpse had no legal 
  
 217 See, e.g., Darcy v. Presbyterian Hosp., 95 N.E. 695, 696 (N.Y. 1911) 
(concluding that Larson “fully meets [the New York Court of Appeals’] approval”); 
Foley, 37 N.Y.S. at 474; Wilding Knope, supra note 180, at 177 (describing how the 
quasi-property right came to embrace “the right to refuse an autopsy, the right to 
prevent the removal of body parts, and the right to recover damages for any outrage, 
indignity, or injury to the body of the deceased” (quoting Philippe Ducor, The Legal 
Status of Human Materials, 44 DRAKE L. REV. 195, 229 (1996))). 
 218 Cf. Michelle Bourianoff Bray, Personalizing Personalty: Toward a Property 
Right in Human Bodies, 69 TEX. L. REV. 209, 228 (1990) (arguing that “American 
courts have evolved from protecting the family’s interest in the corpse through property 
law to contending that there is no property in a corpse and instead protecting the 
family’s interest through tort law, a position functionally similar to that taken by 
English courts”). 
 219 See Hernández, supra note 183, at 991-94. 
 220 Id. at 994 (quoting WILLIAM PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 44 (2d ed. 1955)). 
 221 NWABUEZE, supra note 183, at 59 (“The concept of quasi-property is an 
ingenious invention by the US courts to help a deserving plaintiff. It is a legal fiction. It 
has no relationship with property in the ordinary sense of that word. The concept of 
quasi-property is a judicial contrivance that provides a legal basis for judicial remedy. 
It does not mean that a plaintiff has property interest in a corpse in the traditional 
sense of property right.” (footnotes omitted)); see also Ga. Lions Eye Bank, Inc. v. 
Lavant, 335 S.E.2d 127, 128 (Ga. 1985) (“It seems reasonably obvious that such 
property is something evolved out of thin air to meet the occasion, and that in reality 
the personal feelings of the survivors are being protected, under a fiction likely to 
deceive no one but a lawyer.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 222 Danahy v. Kellogg, 126 N.Y.S. 444, 448 (Sup. Ct. 1910). 
 223 Carney v. Knollwood Cemetery Ass’n, 514 N.E.2d 430, 434 (Ohio App. 
1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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market value.224 Accordingly, the courts were incapable of 
quantifying damages in the usual manner for violations like 
illegal dissections. In the quasi-property context, therefore, 
IIED constituted a surrogate theory whereby the courts 
supplanted more traditional claims for interference with a 
possessory right.  
As noted earlier, from the earliest inception of the 
quasi-property right in the American common law, courts 
adhered to the rule that “there is no right of property in a dead 
body.”225 The next of kin had an exclusive right to possess the 
body, but only for a singular purpose: burial. As a result, the 
right occupied an anomalous position between an in rem and an 
in personam entitlement.226 This was possibly a curious 
consequence of the common law system. As one scholar seems to 
suggest, “Whereas the civil law defines property as the aggregate 
of these expectations, the common law focuses on the separate 
legal interests. Under the common law, there is no requirement 
that an interest satisfy all of these expectations before it qualifies 
as property.”227 In other words, because American courts only 
needed to focus on the right to possession in contests over burial 
of dead bodies, they could happily ignore the inconsistency 
between granting a right to exclude while simultaneously 
proclaiming that dead bodies were not property.228 
Several authors have argued that via the quasi-property 
right, the next of kin hold “the most essential sticks in the 
bundle,” including the right to immediate possession, to 
determine disposition, and to seek redress.229 Although some 
  
 224 See NWABUEZE, supra note 183, at 59. 
 225 Danahy, 126 N.Y.S. at 447. 
 226 Compare Larson v. Chase, 50 N.W. 238, 239 (Minn. 1891) (finding that the 
right to immediate possession for burial is “property in the broadest and most general 
sense of that term, viz., something over which the law accords [to the next of kin] 
exclusive control”), with Foley v. Phelps, 37 N.Y.S. 471, 474 (App. Div. 1896) 
(analogizing the right to possession of a corpse with the right to vote, which “can in no 
sense be called a pure right of property . . . [but] is merely a personal right”). 
 227 Hardiman, supra note 175, at 218-19. 
 228 See Wilding Knope, supra note 180, at 176 (describing how American 
courts “circumvented the no-property rule by declaring that a decedent’s relatives did 
have an interest in the body for burial and interment purposes”). 
 229 Mary L. Clark, Keep Your Hands Off My (Dead) Body: A Critique of the 
Ways in Which the State Disrupts the Personhood Interests of the Deceased and His or 
Her Kin in Disposing of the Dead and Assigning Identity in Death, 58 RUTGERS L. REV. 
45, 89 (2005); cf. Jaffe, supra note 176, at 553; but see Brian Morris, Note, You’ve Got to 
be Kidneying Me!: The Fatal Problem of Severing Rights and Remedies from the Body of 
Organ Donation Law, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 543, 547 (2009) (arguing that the quasi-
property right constitutes “nothing more than a right and corresponding duty to bury 
or dispose of a body”). 
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twigs are missing, most notably the right to sell or commercially 
exploit a dead body, the quasi-property right “include[s] more 
twigs than some interests which have received protection.”230 
Therefore, quasi-property should be considered an in rem 
entitlement and afforded the strongest legal protections.  
D. The New York Quasi-Property Right 
Whichever court has jurisdiction to entertain a lawsuit 
over the WTC victims’ remains,231 substantive New York law 
will govern whether the families of those WTC victims have a 
right to claim the unidentified remains.232 As the following 
subsections illustrate, under existing case law, the quasi-
property right also attaches to body parts, cremated remains, 
and even the identified remains of WTC victims. 
1. The Quasi-Property Right Applies to Constituent 
Parts of Dead Bodies 
In Shipley,233 the court had to decide whether the 
plaintiffs could validly claim a quasi-property right to their 
son’s excised brain.234 After OCME completed its autopsy, it 
released the body to the plaintiffs without informing them that 
the brain had been removed and stored in the examiner’s 
office.235 The plaintiffs discovered what happened after they had 
already buried the body.236  
The court held that OCME violated the plaintiffs’ quasi-
property right to exclusive and complete possession of their 
son’s body.237 Shipley therefore stands for the proposition that 
the quasi-property right embraces claims to constituent body 
parts removed from a corpse. The WTC victims’ unidentified 
  
 230 Jaffe, supra note 176, at 553. 
 231 The Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act of 2001 grants 
S.D.N.Y. “original and exclusive jurisdiction over all actions brought for any claim 
(including any claim for loss of property, personal injury, or death) resulting from or 
relating to the terrorist-related aircraft crashes of September 11, 2001.” Pub. L. No. 
107-42, 115 Stat. 230, 241 (2001).  
 232 See Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 9 (1978) 
(explaining that “the underlying substantive interest is created by an independent 
source such as state law” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 233 See supra Part II.A. 
 234 Shipley v. City of New York, 908 N.Y.S.2d 425, 427 (App. Div. 2010). 
 235 Id. 
 236 Id. at 427-28. 
 237 Id. at 427, 430-32. See supra notes 85-94 and accompanying text for a 
review of the court’s analysis. 
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remains are likewise components separated from a human 
body. But are fragmented pieces of bone and tissue analogous 
to an intact organ like a brain? Shipley moves a step in the 
right direction to support quasi-property claims to the WTC 
remains but requires further support.  
2. The Quasi-Property Right Applies to Cremated 
Remains 
In the few New York cases where plaintiffs claimed a 
right to their relatives’ cremated remains, they succeeded.238 
For instance, in Schmidt v. Schmidt, the court held that a 
widow was entitled to her husband’s ashes pursuant to her 
quasi-property right.239 The court directed her brother-in-law—
who had possession of the ashes—to return the remains and 
awarded damages for emotional distress.240  
Booth v. Huff also involved a suit over the right to 
dispose of cremated human remains.241 After the decedent’s 
wife, who was seeking a divorce at the time of her husband’s 
death, scattered his ashes in the Hudson River, his daughters 
sought damages for mental distress.242 They claimed to be the 
decedent’s lawful next of kin and that defendant interfered 
with their quasi-property right to bury the remains by 
“refusing to turn over the remains and disposing of them 
without notifying plaintiffs.”243 Although the immediate issue 
confronting the appellate court involved procedural questions, 
the court assumed that the quasi-property right inhered to the 
decedent’s cremated remains so that it did not have to 
determine who was legally entitled to them.244 
3. The Quasi-Property Right Applies to the Identified 
Partial Remains of the WTC Victims 
One New York court has already ruled that quasi-
property rights attach to the identified remains of a WTC 
  
 238 See infra notes 239-43. 
 239 267 N.Y.S.2d 645, 646-47 (Sup. Ct. 1966) (citing Gostkowski v. Roman 
Catholic Church of Sacred Hearts of Jesus & Mary, 262 N.Y. 320 (1933), and Lubin v. 
Sydenham Hosp., 26 N.Y.S.2d 18 (App. Div. 1941)). 
 240 Id. 
 241 708 N.Y.S.2d 757, 758 (App. Div. 2000). 
 242 Id. 
 243 Id. at 759. 
 244 Id. at 759 n.3. 
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victim.245 Caseres v. Ferrer concerned the right to receive partial 
remains of Michael Trinidad, who died in the towers on 9/11.246 
Partial remains of his body were recovered and identified by 
OCME through DNA testing.247 Trinidad’s sister had petitioned 
the lower court for an order releasing the remains from OCME 
for burial.248 Meanwhile, the decedent’s ex-wife also claimed his 
remains.249 
The Appellate Division affirmed the lower court’s ruling 
that the remains should be released to the decedent’s sister.250 
Because the decedent died intestate, “the only people who have 
standing to seek possession of the remains for preservation and 
burial are his surviving next of kin.”251 Therefore, the ex-wife 
had no standing.252 Under the Rules of the City of New York, 
Title 24, section 205.01,253 the sister “was the next of kin 
qualified to receive his remains and to give instructions 
regarding the burial.”254 Thus, once OCME has affirmatively 
identified by DNA testing the partial remains of a WTC victim, 
the quasi-property right attaches and the statutorily defined 
next of kin are entitled to possession of the remains. 
IV. NEW YORK CITY SHOULD MODIFY SECTION 557 TO 
REQUIRE MANDATORY CONSULTATION WITH THE NEXT 
OF KIN CONCERNING THE DISPOSITION OF CLAIMED BUT 
UNIDENTIFIED HUMAN REMAINS 
As evidenced by Part II, the law governing the 
disposition of unidentified human remains lacks clarity. While 
Hirsch ruled that the next of kin could collectively determine 
the remains’ disposition, provided that all directly participate 
in the process,255 WTC Families concluded that unless remains 
are identifiable, the next of kin have no proprietary interest in 
them.256 Both cases stressed the lack of legislative or judicial 
  
 245 See Caseres v. Ferrer, 774 N.Y.S.2d 372, 373 (App. Div. 2004). 
 246 Id. 
 247 Id. at 372-73. 
 248 Id. at 372. 
 249 Id. at 373. 
 250 Id. 
 251 Id. at 372-73 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 252 Id. at 373. 
 253 See supra notes 74 and 81 and accompanying text. 
 254 Caseres, 774 N.Y.S.2d at 373. The sister qualified as next of kin because 
decedent never remarried, his children were under eighteen and his parents were not 
alive. Id. 
 255 See supra text accompanying notes 113-16. 
 256 See supra text accompanying notes 156-57. 
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guidance on the issue.257 Moreover, although the text of Section 
557 literally grants OCME authority to dispose of unidentified 
remains, the New York City Council rubber-stamped this 
language without considering, or even contemplating, whether 
that authority should apply in situations where unidentified 
remains have been claimed by the next of kin.258 The dispute 
over the Memorial repository reveals the dangers of this lack of 
clarity and guidance. 
A. The Memorial Dispute Revisited 
Both sides of the divide in the Memorial dispute agree 
that the families should have the last word over how to 
determine the final disposition of the WTC victims’ unidentified 
remains. Advocates of the repository plan argue that this has, in 
fact, already happened.259 The decision to return the remains to 
the WTC site, according to Memorial director Alice M. 
Greenwald, was “a direct result of an extensive consultative 
process led by [LMDC] . . . .”260 In 2002, LMDC invited the 
leaders of various 9/11 family advocacy groups to join its Family 
Advisory Council (FAC). FAC ratified the “idea of a repository” 
in the summer of 2002.261 Because LMDC selected 
representatives from the family advocacy groups to speak for all 
the families in a “republican manner,” a former member 
maintains, FAC represented the majority will.262  
In contrast, the gravamen of the Regenhard lawsuit is 
that the families were not adequately consulted in decisions 
concerning the WTC remains.263 The dissenting families contend 
that they were not represented in the LMDC-led process. 
Instead, the families propose that a “democratic” process 
should prevail, in which a decision is fashioned in “consultation 
  
 257 See supra text accompanying notes 119, 155. 
 258 See supra notes 126-30 and accompanying text. 
 259 See Patricia Cohen, Laying Unidentified Remains to Rest, in A Context for 
Terror, N.Y. TIMES (June 6, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2012/ 
06/04/arts/design/museum-panel.html (quoting Charles G. Wolf, a member of the FAC 
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 260 Colwell-Chanthaphonh & Greenwald, supra note 41, at 5. 
 261 See SUMMARY OF OUTREACH, supra note 19. 
 262 Cohen, supra note 259. 
 263 See Hartocollis, supra note 9. 
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with all of the 2,753 families whose loved ones perished on 
9/11.”264 To that end, they assert that the City should begin by 
“writing a letter to all of the victims’ families on this issue, 
holding a series of forums exclusively for them and inviting 
them to take a principal role in the decision.”265 Any final 
disposition, they argue, should represent the will of the 
majority of families.266 
Although these seventeen dissenting families may 
ultimately represent the minority view with respect to the 
repository plan, their lawsuit raises serious concerns about the 
legality, and thus the legitimacy, of that process. Even 
assuming that the outreach efforts undertaken by LMDC were 
adequate and the repository plan did, in fact, represent what 
most family members wanted,267 it is still unclear where LMDC 
derived the authority to initiate and lead this process. LMDC is 
a “joint State-City corporation” created after 9/11 to “help plan 
and coordinate the rebuilding and revitalization of Lower 
Manhattan,” including the Memorial.268 It is a subsidiary of 
New York State Urban Development Corporation (doing 
business as Empire State Development), the state’s “lead 
economic development agency” whose mandate is to “provide 
the highest level of assistance and service to businesses in 
order to encourage economic investment and prosperity . . . .”269 
Thus, a subsidiary of a corporate governmental agency charged 
with assisting business development in Lower Manhattan 
appointed members to a committee purportedly representing 
all 2753 victims’ families; the families then ratified the 
agency’s decision to relocate the remains to the Memorial, and 
all the while the only on-the-books law mentioning anything 
about unidentified remains unequivocally granted power to 
remove, transport, or dispose of them to OCME.  
It should not be surprising that, absent legislative 
guidance, such extra-legal measures were taken. This dispute, 
  
 264 Cohen, supra note 259. 
 265 Id. 
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 267 Such an assumption is far from ironclad. A reasonable observer could 
interpret LMDC’s summary of outreach to the families as merely providing notice of a 
plan LMDC and FAC had already decided to pursue. See SUMMARY OF OUTREACH, 
supra note 19. 
 268 About Us, LMDC, http://www.renewnyc.com/overlay/AboutUs/ (last visited 
Oct. 10, 2012). 
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therefore, should be seen as a clarion call to legislators to 
clarify the law governing the disposition of human remains. In 
the following section, this note suggests one possible solution to 
the problem of unidentified human remains, borrowed from the 
repatriation of Native American remains under the Native 
American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA).270  
B. An Apt Analogy: NAGPRA Mandates Consultation in 
the Case of Culturally Unidentifiable Human Remains 
As discussed earlier, the law as it currently exists 
relegates unidentified remains to a state of legal limbo in 
situations where next of kin claim commingled and 
unidentified remains.271 This note recommends that, at a 
minimum, the New York City Council revisit Section 557 to 
consider whether it really intended to grant OCME such 
blanket authority over unidentified human remains. The 
Council would then have three choices. First, it could simply 
decide that OCME should have absolute authority over 
unidentified remains and may dispose of them at its discretion. 
Second, the Council could modify Section 557 to require that 
OCME retain possession of unidentified remains indefinitely 
until advances in DNA testing allow for identification and 
repatriation. Finally, it could amend Section 557 to provide a 
mechanism by which the next of kin determine, to the fullest 
extent practicable, the disposition of unidentified remains. 
This note argues that the third option represents the 
best possible outcome. Though DNA identification represents a 
logical, bright-line threshold before the quasi-property right 
will obtain, it seems unjust for a government agency—and not 
the families—to determine the victims’ “final and most 
enduring state.”272 Indeed, the establishment of the quasi-
property right—though it is inapplicable here—was as much 
about the needs of the next of kin as it was about according 
dignity to the decedent: it assists the survivors “in coming to 
terms with the loss and their grief, particularly where the 
death was unexpected.”273 Consequently, lawmakers should 
  
 270 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3013 (2006). 
 271 See supra Part II. 
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contemplate new standards and procedures for the disposition 
of claimed but unidentifiable human remains. In devising this 
new legal framework, the Council should look to the 
repatriation of unidentified human remains under NAGPRA as 
a paradigm. 
Congress enacted NAGPRA274 in 1990 to “remedy 
inadequacies in state law dealing with the protection of Native 
American remains and cultural objects.”275 Among various 
provisions, the statute and its accompanying regulations 
establish rules and procedures requiring and administering the 
return of culturally identifiable276 human remains possessed by 
museums or federal agencies to the appropriate Native 
American tribe.277 By passing this human-rights legislation, 
Congress was “concerned with treating Indian remains with 
dignity and allowing tribes possessory rights over human 
remains . . . associated with their tribes.”278 Implicit in 
NAGPRA is the idea that Native American descendants 
possess quasi-property rights in their ancestors’ remains.279 
Additionally, in circumstances where the cultural 
affiliation of human remains cannot be positively determined 
by the agency or museum, NAGPRA nevertheless mandates 
their return if a claimant is able to demonstrate cultural 
affiliation by a preponderance of the evidence.280 The standard 
is not one of “scientific certainty”; rather, NAGPRA only 
requires a “reasonable connection” based on the evidence 
  
should follow the administration of the estate[] [including] proper respect to the dead, a 
regard for the sensibilities of the living, and the due preservation of the public health”). 
 274 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3013. 
 275 Aaron H. Midler, Note, The Spirit of NAGPRA: The Native American 
Graves Protection and Repatriation Act and the Regulation of Culturally Unidentifiable 
Remains, 86 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1331, 1340 (2011). 
 276 Under NAGPRA, “cultural affiliation is the repatriation standard for 
human remains housed in institutional collections.” Id. at 1342. Cultural affiliation is 
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and a lineal descendent, Indian tribe, or Native Hawaiian organization are required to 
return the remains upon request. 43 C.F.R. § 10.10 (2005). 
 277 See Jack F. Trope & Walter R. Echo-Hawk, The Native American Graves 
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proffered by a claimant.281 NAGPRA as initially promulgated, 
however, left a glaring regulatory hole. It failed to address the 
disposition of culturally unidentifiable human remains in cases 
where a claimant was unable to meet the preponderance of the 
evidence standard.282 In 2010, however, the U.S. Department of 
the Interior added new regulations to “clarify NAGPRA’s 
procedures in situations involving culturally unidentifiable 
human remains.”283 Prior to these amendments, NAGPRA 
permitted institutions to retain culturally unidentifiable 
human remains indefinitely.284 Now, however, institutions are 
required to take measures to repatriate these remains.  
The crux of the new regulations lies in 43 C.F.R. 
§ 10.11.285 First, subdivision (c) places an affirmative duty upon 
any museum or federal agency that cannot prove a right of 
possession286 to culturally unidentifiable human remains to offer 
to return the remains to the appropriate tribe or organization, in 
the order of priority delineated in the regulation.287 Second, 
subdivision (b) triggers a duty on the part of these institutions to 
“initiate consultation regarding the disposition of culturally 
unidentifiable remains” with tribes from whose tribal or 
aboriginal lands the remains had been recovered.288 Consultation 
is required after an institution receives a repatriation claim and 
before it offers to transfer control of the human remains.289 The 
aim of consultation is for the institution “to develop a proposed 
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disposition for culturally unidentifiable remains . . . that is 
mutually agreeable to the parties . . . .”290 
By incorporating these two concepts—mandatory 
repatriation and consultation—into Section 557 in the case of 
claimed but unidentified remains, the Council would 
potentially resolve several issues highlighted by the Memorial 
case. First, mandatory repatriation would switch the burden, 
requiring OCME to demonstrate valid cause to retain the 
remains, rather than requiring the next of kin to compel their 
release. Thus, it would significantly diminish OCME’s ability to 
withhold the remains indefinitely.291 Second, mandatory 
consultation would provide a legal mechanism, heretofore 
nonexistent, to facilitate collective decisions by the next of kin 
about the remains’ final disposition. Admittedly, NAPGRA’s 
standard—a disposition “mutually agreeable to the parties”—is 
vague. But the Council could find any number of dispositions 
sufficient. One possibility is that the majority will of the families 
should prevail. Another is for OCME itself to formulate a 
disposition based on discussions with the next of kin, subject to 
court approval.292 Perhaps even the FAC’s “republican” model293 
may be appropriate, which transitions nicely to the final point: a 
procedure under the color of law in which all claimants are 
entitled to consultation confers legitimacy upon the proposed final 
disposition, whatever its form. According to one expert in the field 
of repatriation of Native American remains, the “most important 
stakeholders are the descendants and the best way to resolve 
conflict is through open and respectful dialogue.”294 Indeed, the 
dissenting WTC families have stated that they want only an 
equal voice in the decision over the remains’ disposition.295 If the 
repository plan received the approbation of a majority of families, 
they would accept that judgment—but “decisions made by those 
without authentic authority should not be binding.”296 
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CONCLUSION 
No one but the Creator knows whose remains are among these 
remains and whose is not. Therefore, no one family or group of 
families can lay claim to saying, “my son,” “my daughter,” “my 
husband,” etc., is among the remains, and no one can have exclusive 
say of what should happen with them. This is why these remains are 
still in the custody of [OCME].297 
This note set out to discover who is legally empowered to 
control the disposition of claimed but yet-to-be-identified human 
remains in the context of the legal battle over New York City’s 
plan to transfer the WTC victims’ remains to the National 
September 11 Memorial and Museum. Under the complex web of 
existing New York laws, these remains float in a state of legal 
limbo. While the quasi-property right to possession of a 
decedent’s body is robust, strong enough even to entitle the next 
of kin to an identified fragment of a WTC victim,298 the Memorial 
case has circumscribed the boundary of that right: DNA 
identification.299 So until OCME identifies the remains, the 
victims’ families have no legal basis to control or dispose of 
them. Meanwhile, pursuant to a hastily enacted amendment to 
the New York City Charter, OCME may dispose of unidentified 
remains even if the next of kin have submitted claims.300 
Therefore, this note recommends that the New York 
City Council reevaluate Section 557 in order to clarify the 
ambiguities and deficiencies in the law governing unidentified 
human remains. In doing so, the Council should devise a 
means for the next of kin, rather than OCME or the City, to 
determine the remains’ final disposition. These changes should 
be modeled upon the mandatory repatriation and consultation 
provisions in NAGPRA. 
Patrick J. Mulqueen† 
  
 297 Cohen, supra note 259 (quoting Charles G. Wolf, a member of the FAC 
whose wife died at the WTC).  
 298 See supra Part III.D.3. 
 299 See supra Part III. 
 300 See supra Part II.A.  
 † J.D. Candidate, Brooklyn Law School, 2013; B.A., University of 
Pennsylvania, 2006. To the editors and staff of the Brooklyn Law Review, I am grateful 
for your patience and hard work. To my mother Karen, I thank you for your 
unconditional love, support, and encouragement. Everything I am or ever hope to be, I 
owe to you. 
